Warne v. Hall: Well-Pleaded for Whom? by Kim, Hanie
Denver Law Review Forum 
Volume 94 Article 3 
10-4-2016 
Warne v. Hall: Well-Pleaded for Whom? 
Hanie Kim 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlrforum 
Recommended Citation 
Hanie Kim, Warne v. Hall: Well-Pleaded for Whom?, 94 Denv. L. Rev. F. (2016), available at 
https://www.denverlawreview.org/dlr-online-article/2016/10/4/warne-v-hall-well-pleaded-for-
whom.html?rq=warne%20v.%20hall%3A%20 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Denver Law Review Forum by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, 
please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
 
1 
WARNE V. HALL: WELL-PLEADED FOR WHOM? 
In Colorado, plaintiffs filing complaints in state court will be facing 
a new standard to survive a 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss. Complaints must 
now include sufficient facts to plausibly give rise to a claim for relief. 
While federal litigants will be familiar with this standard, having been 
adopted by the federal courts several years ago, the Colorado Supreme 
Court recently announced the adoption of the same “plausibility” criteria. 
The ruling in Warne v. Hall
1
 abolishes the liberal standard previously 
used in dismissing complaints only when it appeared a plaintiff could 
prove no set of facts to support their claim.
2
 
In 2007 and 2009, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Bell At-
lantic Corp. v. Twombly
3
 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal
4
 that factual allegations in 
a complaint must be enough to raise a right to relief “above the specula-
tive level.”
5
 The Court, describing the holding as an interpretation of 
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asserted only complaints 
that state a plausible claim could defeat a motion to dismiss.
6
 This new 
“plausible on its face” pleading standard replaced the “no set of facts” 
standard that the Court adopted in Conley v. Gibson.
7
 The Conley stand-
ard dismissed claims when it was beyond doubt that a plaintiff could 
prove “no set of facts” that would give rise to relief.
8
 Under Conley, 
complaints were only to provide a short and plain statement to give the 
defendant fair notice of the claim.
9
 With the Supreme Court narrowing 
the requirements of a sufficient complaint and lowering the bar for their 
dismissal in federal court, it remained to be seen how state courts would 
respond to the creation of a new federal pleading standard. 
In 2014, Bill Hall filed a complaint in Colorado state district court 
alleging intentional interference with a contract by the Town of Gilcrest 
and the mayor of the town, Menda Warne.
10
 Hall and Ensign United 
States Drilling, Inc. had a purchase agreement for a parcel of land.
11
 The 
drilling company terminated the agreement after negotiations between 
the parties failed.
12
 Hall believed the Town of Gilcrest and Warne inten-
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tionally interfered with the contract by creating unreasonable conditions 
to cause the deal’s failure.
13
 Hall further asserted that the motives behind 




As Hall’s complaint contained both federal and state claims, the 
case was removed to federal court.
15
 In federal court, Warne filed a mo-
tion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6).
16
 
The case was then remanded back to state district court after Hall’s dis-
missal of the federal claims.
17
 Warne’s motion to dismiss in federal court 
was converted to a motion to dismiss under the state rules of civil proce-
dure.
18
 Warne urged the state district court to apply the same Iq-
bal/Twombly standard that would have been used in federal court to de-
termine if Hall’s complaint should move into case management and dis-
covery.
19
 At the trial court level, Warne’s motion to dismiss was granted 
for Hall’s failure to state a claim.
20
 However, the trial court made no ref-
erence to any particular standard of pleading.
21
 On appeal, the appellate 
court reversed the dismissal and stated that they declined to apply the 
Iqbal/Twombly standard of pleading of “plausible on its face”.
22
 On June 
27, 2016, the Colorado Supreme Court published their ruling in Warne v. 
Hall, holding that the complaint was not sufficient to survive a motion to 
dismiss.
23
 In a 4-3 decision, the court announced the adoption of the 
United States Supreme Court’s Iqbal/Twombly “plausible on its face” 




The majority opinion, authored by Justice Coats, addressed the core 
issue of whether Colorado should mirror the federal rules of procedure.
25
 
The opinion stressed the importance of uniformity between state and 
federal judicial proceedings.
26
 Justice Coats went as far as to say this was 
the principle goal of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure.
27
 Citing the 
“Conformity Act” of 1789, the opinion referred to the “highly persuasive 
guidance” of the federal courts on states when discussing the same rule.
28
 
The ruling warned that failing to adopt the standard set by the United 
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States Supreme Court “risks undermining confidence in the judicial pro-
cess and the objective interpretation of codified law.”
29
 Therefore, the 
Colorado’s adoption of the plausible on its face pleading was necessary 
to further confidence of the judicial system and court proceedings. 
Also discussed by the majority is the great benefit of being able to 
dismiss baseless complaints earlier in the litigation process.
30
 The ma-
jority finds that the Iqbal/Twombly standard champions judicial economy 
and reduces the expense of lawsuits in general.
31
 In using the “plausible 
on its face” criteria, unfounded complaints are prevented from going 
through the case management and discovery phase needlessly.
32
 
The dissent, authored by Justice Gabriel, joined by Justice Marquez 
and Justice Hood, finds no reason to cave to the federal interpretation of 
civil procedure for the mere sake of uniformity and consistency.
33
 The 
dissent finds that the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure were clearly 
meant to have a more lenient standard of pleading based on the language 
found in the rule.
34
 Justice Gabriel points out Colorado Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(e)(1) allows a pleading to contain allegations based upon 
“information and belief”, a phrase not included in the federal rule.
35
  
Furthermore, Justice Gabriel finds no support for the plausibility 
standard in the language of the federal rules or the Colorado rules.
36
 
Therefore the idea that the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure should 
now requires the Iqbal/Twombly standard in pleadings “misperceives the 
existing state of the law in Colorado and grafts onto C.R.C.P 8 a “plausi-
bility” requirement that the rule does not contain.”
37
 
Another point made by the dissent is the unusual amount of power 
bestowed on a judge to dismiss a claim based on speculative factors.
38
 As 
a judge decides what a plaintiff may be plausibility able to prove, the 
dismissal of claims before any evidence or discovery is presented rests in 
the hands “of the particular judge who happens to be assigned to the 
case.”
39
 Citing the subjective nature of this decision, the dissent hardly 
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Who benefits from the Iqbal/Twombly standard and why? The dis-
sent asserts that the Conley standard has been adequate for the purpose of 
a complaint: to give fair notice to the defendant of the claim being made 
and on what basis.
41
 This notice allows a defendant to develop their ar-
guments and assertions, to ensure proceedings are fair and not prejudicial 
to a party who was not given fair notice. The majority opinion spends a 
great deal of time discussing how the Iqbal/Twombly standard helps in 
“weeding out groundless complaints” and its effectiveness in reducing 
the cost of litigation.
42
 The majority reports “a growing need . . . to expe-
dite the litigation process and avoid unnecessary expense, especially with 
respect to discovery.”
43
 In focusing on this benefit to the “plausible on its 
face” standard in pleading, the majority uncovers a different meaning 
and purpose behind the well-pleaded complaint. Could it be that com-
plaints are meant only to act as a gatekeeper for the courts? 
If one is to believe that complaints should be pleaded to give fair 
notice to a defendant, then the Conley standard continues to be adequate 
and appropriate for pleadings. The “no set of facts” test allowed for 
complaints to be heard. They also gave a defendant adequate opportunity 
to develop their own arguments and assertions about the wrong that was 
purported to have occurred. The Conley standard presented no issue with 
giving a defendant fair notice to defend oneself from a claim, which 
would then force no change to this requirement.  
If one is to believe that complaints should be used as a benchmark 
for keeping plaintiffs and their complaints out of the court system, then 
the Iqbal/Twombly standard conforms to that idea. The “plausible on its 
face” sets a higher bar for plaintiffs to ask the court for relief. And it asks 
a judge to ask himself if the claim could be proven by the plaintiff; rather 
than asking if the claim gives a defendant fair notice in the furtherance of 
justice and preventing prejudicial effect.  
In ruling on Warne v. Hall, the state of Colorado finds itself on the 
side of judicial economy and the desire to reduce the number of cases 
being litigated, regardless of what is fair and just to a plaintiff, defendant, 
or the wrongs that have been committed. In applying the Iqbal/Twombly 
standard to pleadings, if it appears you cannot plausibly show you are 
entitled to relief, despite not having presented a single piece of evidence 
to dispute that belief, you have failed to state a claim. Your complaint 
will be dismissed without reference to the merits or evidence.  
It remains to be seen how the Iqbal/Twombly standard will affect 
the number complaints allowed to move into discovery and the number 
of motions to dismiss being granted in Colorado. On the federal level, a 
  
 41. Id. (Gabriel, J. Dissenting). 
 42. Id. at 594. 
 43. Id.  
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recent study revealed that civil rights cases and employment discrimina-
tion claims have been dismissed at a higher rate since Iqbal/Twombly.
44
 
Additionally, government and corporate plaintiffs are performing better 
than individuals in surviving a motion to dismiss.
45
 However, when 
comparing dismissal rates pre and post Iqbal/Twombly, “there is almost 
no significant change” and “there has been little if any change in party 
behavior as a result of plausibility pleading” according to the same 
study.
46
 Additionally, the study asserts that the new heightened pleading 
standard has not resulted in “higher quality lawsuits” as hoped.
47
 There-
fore, if Colorado mirrors the federal courts, the new “plausible on its 
face” standard may have no discernable impact to complaints filed in 
state court.  
In any case, the Supreme Court of Colorado has sent a clear mes-
sage that they desire uniformity and conformity with the federal courts. 
But if the verdict is still out on whether Iqbal/Twombly has had a positive 
impact on litigation, Colorado should have paused before following in 
line to be in step with the federal courts. In prematurely adopting the 
“plausible on its face” standard, Colorado is now left with a standard 
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